Notice of Intent

Historical examples of the French and Polish resistance movements during World War II vividly illustrate the dire consequences of compromised information. Such breaches often resulted in brutal reprisals against resistance fighters, their families, and even their village. Occupying forces frequently targeted police stations as a strategic means to uncover potential members of the resistance, especially those known to possess firearms. This tactic is documented through several key points that highlight the risks faced by individuals involved in resistance efforts.  The key lessons from history are: 

Local Collaboration : Occupying armies relied on local police to help identify resistance fighters, using them to gather intelligence on suspected individuals.
Suppression Efforts : In countries like France and Poland, occupying forces conducted raids and surveillance with the assistance of police, specifically seeking records related to firearms and resistance activities.
Repression Tactics : Historical accounts from the French Resistance show that the Gestapo and other occupiers infiltrated local police forces to extract information on resistance members.
Civilian Reprisals : Identifying resistance members often led to reprisals against fighters and their families, as occupying forces aimed to create fear and deter opposition.
Documented Evidence : Numerous resistance memoirs and military reports detail the systematic targeting of police to suppress resistance movements.Overall, the targeting of police stations for intelligence gathering was a strategic method employed by occupying forces throughout the war.

References:

Beevor, A. (2009). “D-Day: The Battle for Normandy.” Viking.
Jackson, J. (2003). “French Resistance: A History.” Oxford University Press.
Mendelsohn, M. (2004). “The Polish Resistance Movement 1939-1945.” Harvard University Press.
McNab, C. (2007). “The Spanish Civil War.” Osprey Publishing.

In the context of Australia, the risks magnify in the event of an invasion, as modern technology enables adversaries to recover deleted data, which could jeopardize the identities of firearm owners and resistance organisers.

This technology is further enhanced when adversaries operate from within the occupied country, allowing them to leverage local resources and infrastructure to more effectively breach security protocols and information systems.

As we prepare for a major conflict in the Pacific, it is imperative that part of the civil defence strategy involves migrating all sensitive data to a central server managed by the Australian Defence Force (ADF). This server must be designed to operate in isolation from the internet, ensuring that it cannot be accessed by adversaries during an invasion.

Should all else fail and Canberra fall under enemy control, the ADF would have the final recourse to destroy the hard drives, thereby safeguarding critical information and facilitating a more robust resistance against the occupiers. Such measures are essential to create a resilient and decentralized resistance network capable of enduring occupation.

While the Prime Minister can exercise emergency powers during an invasion, deleting firearm registries would require approval from all state governments, complicating and prolonging the process. Furthermore, some state leaders may prefer appeasement, which may not align with the commitment to resistance.

We are reaching out to inform the public of our plans to initiate a class action lawsuit concerning the right to “security of person” within the framework of Australia’s national security. This decision is prompted by a rising concern among analysts and military strategists that Australia may emerge as a potential target for aggression, similar to Taiwan.

As the CCP intensifies its influence and territorial claims, including assertions of sovereignty over Australia by its educated youth, there is an urgent need to reassess national security strategies. This reevaluation must encompass the creation of a comprehensive war plan that acknowledges that defending against an invader requires not only military action but also the active involvement of the civilian population.

In 2022, Major General Jim Molan in his book, “Danger on our Doorstep” raised urgent concerns regarding modern military readiness, highlighting that the nature of contemporary conflicts has changed significantly from traditional large-scale wars. This transformation presents challenges for national defence, especially since conscription may not be a feasible solution given the shortened training timelines for new recruits in an age of swift military action.

It’s not merely about “avoiding confrontation,” as the Minister for Foreign Affairs recently suggested; it’s about standing resolute against the aggression of a superpower that our military cannot face alone.

How could a conflict over Taiwan affect the United States’ strategic position in our region, potentially resulting in a withdrawal following significant losses? Is the assumption that the United States will not retreat a foundational element of our current national defense strategy? A superpower aiming to prevent nuclear escalation might opt for a proxy war—could Australia find itself becoming the Ukraine of the Pacific?

Our demand is straightforward: in the event of an invasion that our military cannot repel, as acknowledged by the Chief of the Military, firearm registries must not be allowed to fall into the hands of an occupying force. The importance of this demand is highlighted by historical lessons, particularly from World War II, where compromised intelligence significantly undermined the efforts of resistance movements, such as those in France and Poland.

The authority to delete firearm registries is primarily vested in state and territory legislation, not in the hands of the Prime Minister. Although the Prime Minister may exercise emergency powers during an invasion, deleting firearm registries would require the approval of all the state governments, making it a process that could be complex and time-consuming in reaching a consensus. We believe that certain state governments may pursue a policy of appeasement that is unacceptable to individuals committed to the necessity of resistance.

The prospective deletion of firearm registries is essential to ensure they cannot be weaponized against us. This measure would facilitate the creation of a unified Australian resistance force that can operate effectively in occupied territories under the direction of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), thereby making it a federal concern rather than a state issue.

Furthermore, such laws empowering the Prime Minister would not influence firearm legislation during peacetime. Those who oppose our right to security must recognise that without a strong resistance force, the chances of the Australian Defence Force successfully repelling an invader diminish considerably.

We call for the enactment of a law dedicated to “Safeguarding the Human Right to Security of Person” that reflects our commitment to resisting any occupier.