Historical examples of the French and Polish resistance movements during World War II vividly illustrate the dire consequences of compromised information. Such breaches often resulted in brutal reprisals against resistance fighters, their families, and even their village. Occupying forces frequently targeted police stations as a strategic means to uncover potential members of the resistance, especially those known to possess firearms. This tactic is documented through several key points that highlight the risks faced by individuals involved in resistance efforts.  The key lessons from history are: 

Local Collaboration : Occupying armies relied on local police to help identify resistance fighters, using them to gather intelligence on suspected individuals.
Suppression Efforts : In countries like France and Poland, occupying forces conducted raids and surveillance with the assistance of police, specifically seeking records related to firearms and resistance activities.
Repression Tactics : Historical accounts from the French Resistance show that the Gestapo and other occupiers infiltrated local police forces to extract information on resistance members.
Civilian Reprisals : Identifying resistance members often led to reprisals against fighters and their families, as occupying forces aimed to create fear and deter opposition.
Documented Evidence : Numerous resistance memoirs and military reports detail the systematic targeting of police to suppress resistance movements.Overall, the targeting of police stations for intelligence gathering was a strategic method employed by occupying forces throughout the war.

References:

Beevor, A. (2009). “D-Day: The Battle for Normandy.” Viking.
Jackson, J. (2003). “French Resistance: A History.” Oxford University Press.
Mendelsohn, M. (2004). “The Polish Resistance Movement 1939-1945.” Harvard University Press.
McNab, C. (2007). “The Spanish Civil War.” Osprey Publishing.

In the context of Australia, the risks magnify in the event of an invasion, as modern technology enables adversaries to recover deleted data, which could jeopardize the identities of firearm owners and resistance organisers.

This technology is further enhanced when adversaries operate from within the occupied country, allowing them to leverage local resources and infrastructure to more effectively breach security protocols and information systems.

No software can manipulate the mindset of an IT manager when faced with the dire ultimatum of surrendering access credentials or facing a firing squad. Such pressure transcends technology and speaks to the human spirit in moments of personal survival. 

While the Prime Minister can exercise emergency powers during an invasion, deleting the national firearm register may be possible?   However, deleting the State and Northern Territory firearm registries would require approval from all state and territory governments, complicating and prolonging the process.

Additionally, certain state leaders might lean toward appeasement, which could conflict with their obligation to protect the security of all firearm owners. This includes those individuals who form part of a resistance, a significant number of whom are likely to stem from the target sports community, given the presence of both retired and active military, police, and security personnel throughout Australia.

As the CCP enhances its influence and territorial claims, notably asserting sovereignty over Australia via its educated youth, it’s crucial to reassess national security strategies. This should involve developing a comprehensive war plan that emphasizes the importance of civilian involvement alongside military action in defending against invasions.

In his 2022 book, “Danger on our Doorstep,” Major General Jim Molan expressed urgent concerns about modern military readiness, noting that contemporary conflicts differ significantly from traditional large-scale wars. Such changes present challenges for national defense, particularly since conscription may be impractical due to reduced training times for new recruits.

It’s not solely about “avoiding confrontation,” as recently suggested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs; it’s about standing firm against a superpower that our military cannot confront alone.

How might a Taiwan conflict impact the U.S. strategic position in our region? Could it lead to a withdrawal after considerable losses? Is the belief that the U.S. won’t retreat a cornerstone of our current defense strategy? A superpower aiming to prevent nuclear escalation might choose a proxy war—could Australia become the Ukraine of the Pacific?

We demand that in the event of an invasion that our military can’t repel, firearm registries must not fall into the hands of an occupying force. This is underscored by historical lessons from World War II, where compromised intelligence severely hindered resistance efforts in France and Poland.

Authority to delete firearm registries lies primarily with state and territory legislation, not the Prime Minister. Although the Prime Minister could invoke emergency powers during an invasion, erasing firearm registries would require consensus from all state governments, complicating and prolonging the process.

Some state government leaders may adopt an appeasement policy unacceptable to those committed to resistance.

The potential deletion of firearm registries is vital to prevent them from being used against us. This would support the establishment of a unified Australian resistance force, a national civil defense unit, capable of operating in occupied areas under Australian Defence Force (ADF) guidance, thus making it a Commonwealth matter rather than a State issue.

Additionally, such laws empowering the Prime Minister wouldn’t affect firearm legislation in peacetime. Critics of our right to security must acknowledge that without a strong resistance force, the Australian Defence Force’s likelihood of repelling an invader diminishes significantly.

We assert that the complainant mentioned in the correspondence from the Australian Human Rights Commission is the primary aggrieved individual, and that all registered firearm owners also qualify as aggrieved parties.

Ultimately, when the harsh reality of war sets in, the unwavering commitment to prevent firearm registries from being surrendered to an occupier—deemed an act of “appeasement”—will mobilize the National Civil Defence, both formally and informally, to stand in solidarity with the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Until that time comes, I, as someone who feels wronged, firmly assert that no individual on the firearm registry would willingly disclose their information to an occupier, especially if they are part of the National Civil Defence supporting the ADF in areas of Australia under occupation.

Should the unimaginable horror of an invasion become a reality, the Australian Government has a fundamental responsibility to safeguard its citizens by ensuring that the names of firearm owners do not fall into the hands of an occupying force. History has shown us the dire consequences that can ensue from violating this essential human right to “security of person.” Our national security is significantly compromised if the Government fails to acknowledge the threat, especially in light of the warnings from reputable military advisory institutions and specialist organizations. A major conflict in our region is anticipated, possibly as early as 2027.

If you are interested in joining a potential class action against the Commonwealth of Australia, please contact “Alex” at: securityofperson@pm.me.

A complaint regarding the Human Right of “Security of Person” [SEC=OFFICIAL]

03/09/2025